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Tracking the position 
Global satellite navigations in Europe 








Mankind has a thirst to travel and while travel into outer space is a relatively new concept, 
we increasingly rely, on Earth, on technologies deployed in space to aid our safety, security – 
including in a transport context, where we look for efficient and effective means.  
 
This paper focuses on satellite navigation systems and European undertakings to compete in, 
what is becoming, an ever-growing, competitive market. The specific focus is on GALILEO 
– the journey undertaken in terms of endeavouring to make it fully operational by the end of 
2020. As part of this, comment and reflection are provided as to the challenges encountered – 
including Covid-19 and the relationship between the UK and EU.  This includes commentary 
as to the implications of Brexit, in terms of access and use of, and to, European satellite 
navigation systems. 
 
The research-design applied is historical, policy and legislative based. It commences by 
considering the origins of global navigations systems before the focus is turned to Europe and 
reviewing the development of GALILEO (alongside EGNOS and the European Global 
Navigation Satellite Systems Agency). 
 
The research finds that a fully operational GALILEO will likely not be achieved in 2020; 
and, that the UK, whilst contributing massively (both financially and technologically) is 
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The meaning, and understanding, of ‘space’ is a complex phenomenon.1  
 
The word (definition of space) is able to be applied both as a noun and verb. From the 
perspective of the former (according to an agreed approach by most dictionary definitions) it 
is viewed as an area that is free and unoccupied. We occupy a ‘space’ by moving objects or 
persons into it; thereby, in many ways, staking a claim, or ownership, or occupancy of that 
space. From this perspective, ‘space ownership’ stands to cover many areas and aspect of law 
and is variably a multifaceted concept.  
 
Mankind has a thirst to travel, to discover and even to conquer.2 Many ‘spaces’ have been 
fought over. While, this normally involves the concept of space on a landmass, and hence 
land being defended, this does not have to be case, and thus, battles have also been pursued 
on the sea and in the air to defend a space, or, put another way, a claimed territory. From a 
social perspective, we look to travel – for many, many reasons: to visit new places, to have 
new encounters or experiences and to revisit areas and places – to reconnect to something 
positive, to somewhere we have previously been, to get new knowledge, to develop, or to see 
friends and family members. The reasons are numerous and again complex. 
 
There is thus a synergy, or symbiotic relationship between space and movement; and, hence 
we enter into the realms of travelling into or through space to arrive at a destination.  And, 
from this concept, perhaps one of the biggest ‘spaces’ that can be envisaged, is the space that 
lies outside of Earth’s atmosphere – that which is above us – or viewed another way, in outer 
space.  
 
Mankind’s travel into outer space is a relatively new concept and one which has already led 
to competitive practices and space-races.3 These days, there is also an inherent linkage to the 
concept of virtual travel or communications – where the information and data travels, rather 
than the actual person travelling to acquire the knowledge. 
 
This paper looks at the concept and progress of European space endeavours;4 (those above 
us) and as said, appreciating that this is a multi-layered and complex subject, covering many 
EU areas and policies – this research is confined to the area of global navigation satellite 
systems, exploring the (historical) development of the European satellite system(s) and the 
relationship with transport.   
 
The study is therefore undertaken by applying the following research-design approach, to: 
 
- Firstly, consider the origins of global navigation systems, including within Europe; 
and, 
 
- Secondly, review the development of respective satellite systems (in Europe) 
commencing with EGNOS and the changing role of the (now) European Global 
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Before, turning to the main focus; 
 
- Thirdly, to examine in further detail, the development of the navigations services and 
systems – with specific focus on ‘GALILEO’ – the name given to Europe’s system – 
which was declared to become fully operational in 2020.5  
In this respect, brief comment is made to the implications of Covid-19. 
 
Finally, the paper concludes with a short discussion of the UK relationship with the European 
satellite systems, post Brexit. 
 
The legislative (law) approach applied, in this design, relates to identifying and analysing key 
EU documents (past and present). 
 
 
1.1. Structural approach 
 
In order to appreciate the design and approach of this paper (and therefore the specific  
research area) it is perhaps important to firstly appreciate the relationship between the key  
aspects being discussed; namely as viewed from the current structure/remit of the  





Figure 1: Organisational structure of the European Global Navigation Satellite Systems Agency 
(Adapted from the website7) 
 
This paper therefore researches how the current organisational structure has risen in support 
of the aims of Europe to develop global navigations satellite systems. 
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2. Global Navigation Satellite System 
 
2.1. A brief look at the global position 
 
Global navigation satellite system(s) are a relatively new invention which has its origins 
traceably back to the 1950’s and the original space race.8 However, the US military began 
experimenting with the technology in earnest in the 1970’s.   
 
Today global navigations satellite systems are recognised to refer to a constellation of 
satellites providing signals from space that transmit positioning and timing data to receivers. 
The receivers then use this data to determine location. Much is the same way a ‘Hoover’ is 
used to refer to a vacuum cleaner, and certainly from a European perspective, the most 
commonly referred to name for the global satellite navigation system is ‘GPS’, taken from 
the USA system (NAVSTAR9) Global Positioning System.  
 
Outside of the USA, other systems exist in Russia, which has a system called Global'naya 
Navigatsionnaya Sputnikovaya Sistema (GLONASS10), with the Chinese equivalent being 
the BeiDou Navigation Satellite System.11 
 
In general, the performance of such satellite navigation systems is recognised to be assessed 
using four criteria12: 
1. Accuracy: the difference between a receiver’s measured and real position, speed or 
time; 
2. Integrity: a system’s capacity to provide a threshold of confidence and, in the event 
of an anomaly in the positioning data, an alarm; 
3. Continuity: a system’s ability to function without interruption; 
4. Availability: the percentage of time a signal fulfils the above accuracy, integrity and 
continuity criteria. 
 
2.2. European (EU) Origins 
 
In 1993 Europe launched its initial telecommunications satellite.13 The following year, a 
Council Resolution on 19 December 1994 identified the relevance and need for a European 
Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS).14 Specifically, it was stated that GNSS was 
needed for civil use so as to ‘contribute to the attainment of important Community objectives, 
such as the completion of the internal market and the strengthening of economic and social 
cohesion.’ The preamble within the Resolution identified that, the setting-up and 
development of a satellite navigation system was also aimed at improving the long-term and 
sustainable mobility of people and goods throughout Europe thus also aiding transport safety, 
plus assisting in the trans-European networks in the fields of transport, telecommunications 
and energy infrastructure. The legal basis was stated (by the European Commission) as being 
in accordance with Article 129 (b) of the then Treaty (the Treaty establishing the European 
Community.)15 This specifically is the Trans-European Networks (TENs) chapter.16  
 
Recognition was made to the contribution of a European GNSS in respect to transport and the 
following were cited:  
- Resolution on the situation of European civil aviation17  
- Resolution on telematics in the transport sector18  
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Prior to this, in, June, 1994, it was acknowledged that Europe needed to act promptly so that 
control of the entire system did not lay overseas – specifically, from a EU perspective, by 
way of the civil complement to the American military Global Positioning System (GPS).19 
The European Parliament (EP) Resolutions of 19 January 199520 and 18 November 
199421 reinforced the need for Europe to play a key role in the implementation of GNSS, and 
attention was drawn for the need for a coherent and consolidated European strategy to be 
developed in this field. It was said that this would necessitate a coordinated action across 
programmes which should be undertaken by the European Space Agency (ESA).22 
In 1997 a proposal was put forward for a Council Decision on the agreement between the 
European Community, the European Space Agency and the European Organisation for the 
Safety of Air Navigation23 on a European contribution to the development of a global 
navigation satellite system.24 Reinforcement was again made in terms of the significance to 
transport, with specific reference being made to Article 75 of the Treaty,25 which determined: 
For the purpose of implementing Article 74, and taking into account the distinctive 
features of transport, the Council shall, acting in accordance with the procedure 
referred to in Article 189c and after consulting the Economic and Social Committee, 
lay down:  
(a) common rules applicable to international transport to or from the territory of a 
Member State or passing across the territory of one or more Member States;  
(b) the conditions under which non-resident carriers may operate transport services 
within a Member State;  
(c) measures to improve transport safety;  
(d) any other appropriate provisions.  
It was stressed once again that the Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T) recognised 
the importance, and indeed it necessitated, the implementation of a navigation system which 
implements satellite technology.26  
As a consequence of this call, the Council gave a Decision which adopted the proposal, in 
1998.27 Within it, Article 84 was also cited which refers to: transport by rail, road and inland 
waterway, whilst also stating that this may be laid down and applicable to transport by sea 
and air transport.28 This remains still in force. 
The Proposal was quite detailed and gave a review of the direction that was to be pursued in 
terms of a European GNSS. Within this reference was made to the proposal entitled the 
European Geostationary Navigation Overlay Service (EGNOS) which was accepted by the 
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3. EGNOS 
3.1. A brief historical overview: contextualisation 
 
In 1994 the European Council approved the launch of the EGNOS programme.30 EGNOS 
marked Europe’s first activity in the field of GNSS and is a forerunner to Europe’s newer 
‘Galileo’ system.  
 
EGNOS is therefore the first phase (GNSS 1) of the European Union's policy on a global 
navigation satellite system with the second phase (GNSS 2) being the Galileo programme. 
 
EGNOS was established as a joint project of European Space Agency (ESA), the European 
Commission and Eurocontrol.31 On 1 April 2009, after the successful completion of its 
development, EGNOS was transferred to the European Commission. Hence, the Commission 
took over ownership of the EGNOS infrastructure from ESA on behalf of the European 
Union. In this way, EGNOS is said to be technically owned by European citizens. EGNOS 
Open Service has been available since 1 October 2009 and the positioning data is freely 
available in Europe through satellite signals to anyone equipped with an EGNOS-enabled 
GPS receiver. 
 
EGNOS has a clear mandate to aid satellite navigations within Europe and particularly in the 
area of aviation. The aim of the EGNOS programme was thus to improve the quality of 
signals from existing global navigation satellite systems.32  
 
The UK has had a founding role in the operational management (as assigned by the European 
Commission) for the service provision and maintenance of EGNOS – this is through the 
European Satellite Services Provider33 (ESSP) which is a company founded, in 2001, by 
seven European air navigation service providers: 
• AENA (Spain) 
• DFS (Germany) 
• DSNA (France) 
• ENAV (Italy) 
• NATS (United Kingdom) 
• NAV (Portugal) 
• Skyguide (Switzerland) 
EGNOS is a regional (European) satellite-based augmentation system (SBAS). It works via a 
number of reference stations deployed across Europe, taking GNSS measurements which are 
transferred to a central computing centre, where differential corrections and integrity 
messages are calculated.34 The calculations are then broadcast across the area using 
geostationary satellites that serve as an expansion of the original data.  
The objective of EGNOS, in terms of applying improved performance and accuracy of 
GNSS’s, is hence to enhance safety of transport services across the fields of aviation, 
maritime and other land-based modes across most of Europe.  In the aviation sector GNSS 
alone (without EGNOS) does not satisfy the strict operational requirements set by the 
International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) for use in critical flight stages, such as the 
final approach into airports. Since 2011, EGNOS has been certified for civil aviation use, 
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thus satisfying ICAO standards.  From a shipping perspective, European EGNOS contributes 
to successful navigation for all passenger ships and cargo ships larger than 500 gross tonnage, 
which are regulated.  
 
Since 1 January 2014, the utilisation of EGNOS has been fully delegated to the 
European GNSS Agency by the European Commission.35  
 
3.2. European GNSS Agency (GSA36) 
 
Initially the GSA37 was established as a Community Agency,38 on 12 July, 2004, by 
Regulation (EC)1321/2004, as a structure for the management of satellite (radio-navigations) 
programmes in Europe.39 This Regulation was later amended by Regulation (EC) 
No 1942/2006. 40 Neither remain in force, the latter having been repealed in 2010.41 The 2010 
Regulation was hence amended by Regulation (EU) 512/201442 whereby the GSA was 
restructured into an Agency of the European Union – called the European GNSS Agency 
(although still sometimes referred to as the European GSA). 
 
Article 4 refers to the legal status of the European GNSS Agency, stating;43 
1.  The Agency shall be a body of the Union. It shall have legal personality. 
2.  In each of the Member States, the Agency shall enjoy the most extensive legal 
capacity accorded to legal persons under the law….. 
 
The benefit of GNSS’s is continually stressed through the Agency in terms of enhancing not 
only the safety but the security of persons and goods – that is, within the realms of the 
movement of both. And, noticeable, overtime, more emphasise has clearly been accorded to 
the aspect of security, which has become embedded into the operation role of EGNOS and 
the Galileo systems. 
The website for the European GNSS Agency states the following tagline and hence objective 
for the Agency - namely linking space to user needs.44 In this respect it is said that, ‘space is 
the new technological revolution and it is changing the way we live, work and play.’45 
 
The GNSS Agency states its mission is to: 
‘support European Union objectives and achieve the highest return on European GNSS 
investment, in terms of benefits to users and economic growth and competitiveness.’46  
Space equals big money. In 2007, it was identified that the Space market worldwide had a 
value/worth of €90bn, growing then at 7 per cent per annum.47 Today’s forecast, from the 
perspective of the GNSS alone, identifies that Europe will have a greater share of the €175 
billion global GNSS market due to this innovation.48 This will see the creation of many new 
products and services across a wide area of EU policies and initiatives. Globally the GNSS 
downstream market continues to grow rapidly. The forecast for 2019 predicted that the global 
installed base of GNSS devices would reach almost €6.5 billion by the end of that year.49  
Whilst maritime, air and land have always been stressed in terms of identifying the benefit to 
the various modes – (shipping, manned aviation and train); of late, the importance of GNSS 
to the evolving and growing area of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV’s: drones) is also being 
recognised and emphasised. In fact, drones have become a significant GNSS market segment. 
It is emphasised in particular that as an unmanned transport mode GNSS positioning 
information helps to enable both safety in operations alongside harmonious drone market 
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growth. The drone section now actually exceeds mature segments (such as maritime, aviation 
and agriculture) in terms of shipments. In the last 3 years the shipments of drones have 
actually tripled; and, it is anticipated that the growth will continue into the next decade for all 
drone categories.50 It is therefore forecast that this will lead to the generation of more than 2 
billion EUR revenue from 2029, both from device sales and services.  
The increasing use of drones necessitate accurate positional information. It is now being 
recognised that almost 50% of drone users expect a horizontal accuracy of below 10 cm and 
38% a vertical accuracy of below 10cm – this is where EGNOS comes into play in terms of 
drone functionality.51  
Alongside the increasing use of GNSS by drones, the European GSA Market Report (2019) 
identified the recognition of the second developing and important area for GNSS, that of 
Emergency Response use (including for first responders and search and rescue (SAR) 
utilisation). It is perhaps obvious, that there is a direct linkage to the use of transport for such 
operations. The use of GNSS for SAR is particular significant in land, sea and air recoveries, 
with maritime using beacons, such as Emergency Position Indicating Radio Beacons 
(EPIRBs) and Personal Locator Beacons (PLBs); and aircraft using - Emergency Locator 
Transmitters (ELTs) as well as PLBs.  
The vision statement of the European GNSS Agency stresses the positive impact of satellite 
navigation systems within society and to individuals; and, whilst it is stated that this is 
significant across various areas, the utilisation within the various transport modes is however 
heavily, once again, emphasised.  This therefore reinforces the concept of space, 
travel/movement and communications being symbiotic and thus shows the interdependency 
and synergy of these areas.  
In this respect, it is stressed further, that the next logical step ‘will be the integration of 
accurate positioning devices into every mobile telephone or similar handheld device, making 
possible a deep transformation of the way society deals with the dimensions of time and 
space.’52 
There are four principle aims assigned to the mission of the European GNSS Agency. These 
are:53 
• Designing and enabling services that fully respond to user needs, while 
continuously improving the European GNSS services and Infrastructure; 
• Managing the provision of quality services that ensure user satisfaction in the 
most cost-efficient manner;  
• Engaging market stakeholders to develop innovative and effective applications, 
value-added services and user technology that promote the achievement of full 
European GNSS adoption; 
• Ensuring that European GNSS services and operations are thoroughly secure, 
safe and accessible. 
Galileo is an essential factor related to these aims but the journey to get Galileo operational 
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4. GALILEO: Background 
Albert Einstein called Galileo the “father of modern science” – expanding man's 
understanding of the Universe.54 
Galileo di Vincenzo Bonaulti de Galilei55 was born in Italy in 1564. While being widely 
regarded as a polymath….. a physicist, an engineer, a mathematician and an astronomer. He 
is said to be the first person to use a refracting telescope to make important astronomical 
discoveries. He is known to have studied speed, velocity and gravity and is therefore 
recognised to have made fundamental contributions to the science of inertia, the law of 
falling bodies, parabolic trajectories and hence the fundamental change of thinking in the 
study of motion. Given this, Galileo is described as a Renaissance Genius,56 the “father of 
modern (observational) astronomy”57 the “father of modern physics,”58 the “father of 
scientific methods”59 and, ultimately, as the “father of modern (or experimental) science.60” 
 
It is perhaps fitting therefore that the name Galileo was applied to the European global 
satellite-based navigation system.  
 
4.1. Origins of Galileo: Stages 
 
In 1999 the Commission issued a Communication entitled Galileo and stressed the need to 
involve Europe in a New Generation of Satellite Navigation Services.61 This Communication 
clearly set out the situation that Europe presently found itself in and the options that were 
available to it.  
 
The Communication reinforced issues previously identified and faced by Europe62due to the 
reliance on systems from third countries; namely: 
 
- In terms of both sovereignty and security: the fact that Europe's safety critical 
navigation systems lay outside Europe's control.  
- Functioning ability: (the then present) systems could not fully meet civil users’ 
requirements in terms of performance.  
- That there was a need to offer some protections: there was a need to ensure that 
European users were not at risk from changes in the service or excessive future 
charges or fees, which could arise due to dominant position or virtual monopoly 
outside of Europe, which would mean it would be difficult to resist such charges 
(and/or perhaps impossible to develop alternatives quickly). 
  
It was recognised that there were opportunities to work with the US and their GPS and/or the 
Russian authorities’ equivalence - GLONASS. And, hence, it was stressed that Europe had 
already been scoping choices which had narrowed it down to two key options: 
(i) the potential for joint approaches (with the US, the Russian Federation, plus 
others); and  
(ii) clarifying what a European system would look like, plus how much the cost 
would be.  
 
However, emphasis was accorded to the fact there was the capacity for EU industry to 
compete in the lucrative market but that Europe’s potential to compete would be seriously 
constrained, if it did not have equal access to the technological developments in the system 
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itself.63 Therefore, the key outcome was the central recommendation that Europe needed to 
develop its own ‘new’ satellite navigation constellation, combined with appropriate terrestrial 
infrastructure: Galileo.  
 
The possible method to finance Galileo related to a three-point financing strategy:  
o substantial financing at a European level, that being through the EU Budget, notably 
the Transport (TEN-T), and through ESA;  
o establishment of revenue streams, (no doubt requiring regulatory action; and through 
the,   
o development of a public private partnership (PPP). 
 
The follow-up Communication in 200064 clarified the four phases, as the; 
(1) Definition phase: due to be completed at the end of 2000  
(2) Development and validation phase (2001-2005)  
o -  Overall detailed definition of the segments (space, ground, user);  
o -  Development of the satellites and ground-based components;  
o -  Validation of the system “in orbit.” 
 
       (3) Deployment phase (2006-2007)  
a. -  Production, launching of the satellites;  
b. -  Installation of the complete ground segment;  
 
       (4) Operating phase (2008 onwards) 
o -  Satellite renewal, operation of the Centres, maintenance.  
 
4.2. The Galileo constellation 
 
The Galileo concept: ultimately, was to be based on a constellation of 30 satellites placed in a 
medium earth orbit (at an altitude of approximately 24 000 km) which will continuously 
cover the entire surface of the earth.  
 
The selected configuration is said to be optimal, as it is said to ensure ‘the presence of a 
minimum of four satellites above any point of the earth at any moment. Indeed, navigation 
receivers can calculate their position only if they receive simultaneously the signals of a 
minimum of four satellites.’65 
 
4.3. The relationship of EGNOS to Galileo 
 
The relationship and structure for EGNOS and Galileo was questioned and debated for a 
period of time. 
 
In the 2000 Communication update66 it was reiterated as to the positive impact Galileo would 
have in terms of enhancing the contribution to the good management and safety of all modes 
of transport, namely by adding to the quality of existing systems by virtue of its global 
coverage, precision and integrity. 
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Initially a Galileo Joint Undertaking was set up in order to complete the development phase 
of the programme.67 However, there were noticeable delays in setting this up due to problems 
within the ESA structure and the relationship with Member States. This subsequently led to a 
slippage in terms of anticipated completion of certain phases. 
 
EGNOS, as the European precursor to Galileo, was established as a satellite radio navigation 
system that relies on the American GPS and the Russian GLONASS. A 2003 Communication 
considered the need and methods for the integration of the EGNOS programme in the Galileo 
programme.68 Within it, clear recognition was given to the fact that EGNOS was viewed as 
an essential step in the development of the European global navigation satellite system, 
enabling Europe's industry to acquire expertise in the related technologies whereby it was 
said that the ‘know-how accumulated in the framework of the EGNOS programme, both on 
the technical and institutional level, places Europe in a good position to embark on the 
ambitious Galileo programme.’69 It was also acknowledged that EGNOS provided the 
“Galileo brand” to be immediately recognised on the satellite radio navigation market.  
 
However, despite recognition of the contribution that both EGNOS and Galileo could make 
to Europe, in terms of being a leader in global navigation satellite systems, further difficulties 
were encountered which were clearly spelt out in a Communication from the Commission to 
the European Parliament in 2007.70 This led to further questions being raised in terms of the 
relationship between EGNOS and Galileo, the respective governance structure; and, indeed, 
the direction of Europe in respect to satellite systems. 
 
4.4. Galileo at a cross-road 
 
Whilst the first Galileo experimental satellite was launched in December 2005,71 the 
Communication identified that decisions were needed as Galileo (and indeed EGNOS) lay at 
a cross-roads in terms of the ability to meet phased deadlines and targets – which could 
impact, not only on costs, but ultimately success in a developing and succeeding in an ever 
competitive area.   
 
In essence, the European GNSS programmes - Galileo and EGNOS, had accumulated a delay 
of five years with regard to the initial calendar and deadlines for a number of reasons and at 
various intervals over the previous seven years, including political, governance and industrial 
factors.  
 
The 2007 Communication referred to the fact that the Council of Transport Ministers (22 
March 2007) requested the Commission to: 
 
o assess and report by the June Council on overall progress of the Galileo 
project, including reporting on the project cost and financing thereof;  
o submit, as soon as possible solutions for securing the long-term public 
financial obligations;72 
o assess (assisted by the GSA and ESA) the progress including risks and 
affordability. 
 
Likewise, the European Parliament, in its Resolution of 24 April 2007,73 whilst reiterating its 
support for the Galileo programme, also expressed its concerns about the progress. It 
therefore called on the Commission to come forward with appropriate proposals, based in 
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part on the same points as mentioned by the Council and, in particular, ‘for a strengthening of 
public governance by ensuring political responsibility and leadership of the Commission.’74 
 
One factor questioned, in the Communication, was: Does Europe need a satellite navigation 
system? And, whether in view of the difficulties encountered, asked whether the programme 
should be pursued or even stopped. 
 
However, all the reasons for the original conception, incentive and motivation were again, 
not only identified, but reinforced: Europe needed to be in space to compete in a growing 
industry that would inevitable see a return on the already engaged €2.5 billion in the 
development of the European GNSS programmes (as of that date75). In other words, Europe 
could not afford not to be, particularly given this enormous investment already i.e. to date. 
The question(s) therefore, given this acknowledgment, centred around how to deliver on this 
outlay.  This necessitated revisiting the original concept; that said, it was also recognised that 
any ‘radical change in design would lead to the cancellation of the actual industrial 
contracts in the development phase and therefore to a full re-bidding for the entire 
programme.’ This would therefore cause a further delay and an even later entry-to-market of 
a system with the potential of having a ‘degraded performances and an undoubtedly low 
resistance in competition against new systems like GPS-III.’76  
  
Across 2007, several other communications and discussions occurred which considered the 
project and particularly other ways to financially support the programme, if it was decided it 
should be continued.77  
 
Finally, in, November, 2007, the Transport Council reached a historical conclusions (at its 
29/30 November session) in which it announced the next phase – the deployment of Galileo. 
It was said this would be carried out and financed by the Community. It was at this stage that 
the Commission declared itself in the new role, namely that of programme manager. 
Subsequently, due to this clarity, in particular the fact that the European Community was to 
assume direct responsibility for the deployment of the system together with the additional 
cost burden, (namely, €2,100 million for the Community budget during the 2007-2013 
financial framework) it was deemed that the initial proposal for a Regulation, relating to 
deployment, should be amended.78 
 
The amended text proposed the need to fully incorporate the EGNOS programme, alongside 
Galileo, as one of the two pillars of the European satellite radio navigation policy.79 This was 
subsequently confirmed in Regulation (EC) No 683/2008 which gave the needed clarity, in 
terms of structure and financing.80 This included repealing the Galileo Joint Undertaking 
system.81 
 
Reference was made within the Regulation (683/2008) to the fact that the development of 
satellite navigation was fully in line with the Lisbon Strategy and other Community policies, 
citing in particular the transport policy, as set out in the Commission’s White Paper, of 
12 September 2001, entitled ‘European transport policy for 2010: time to decide.’82  Hence, it 
was identified that the programmes were a key priority of the projects that were included in 
the Lisbon Action Programme for Growth and Employment (proposed by the Commission 
and endorsed by the European Council) and were therefore considered also as one of the 
major pillars of the future European Space Programme.83  
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Article 22 of Regulation (EC) required a mid-term review of the European satellite 
navigation programmes to be carried out in 2010. This was submitted to the European 
Parliament and to the Council, on 18 January 2011, and, as a consequence, this led to a 
Proposal for a new Regulation.84 At the same time, the Commission proposed to assign 7000 
million Euros to the financing of the European satellite navigation programmes during the 
next multiannual financial framework, for the 2014-2020 period. 
 
Within the Proposal, reference was made to both the Galileo and EGNOS programmes being 
“flagship” projects of the Union, and an essential factor to the Europe 2020 strategy and 
policies for sustainable development.85 Reference was also made to the updated space 
strategy86 and the estimated projected value of both these programmes, estimated to have a 
cumulative worth of approximately EUR 130 billion in the period 2014-2034.87  
 
Most notably the Proposal made reference to the Galileo programme phases, which revealed 
significant delay and slippage from the 2000 Communication.88 Whilst the definition phase 
was identified as being complete, the development and validation phase was identified for 
completion in 2013, some 8-years later than originally stated. The deployment phase was 
identified as having been launched in 2008 and was said to be due for completion in 2020; 
whilst the exploitation phase (to be progressively launched from 2014/15) was also 
anticipated to be fully operational system, also in 2020. 
 
During the procedural steps of the Proposal being heard and debated, reference was made to 
the need again for a better governance structure in order to build “repair the damage to 
market confidence”, the need to accelerate the pace of GNSS deployment and market 
development, especially in light of  
(i) cost of Galileo’s delay and  
(ii) the increasing competition from the US, Russia and China.  
In particular, it was cited that China was expanding its military ‘Beidou’ satellite navigation 
system into the global COMPASS system with the intent of offering competitive civil service 
worldwide by 2020, including within Europe. Hence, there was an identified need for both 
Galileo and EGNOS to become the GNSS standard in Europe as quickly as possible.89 
During the 3171st Council meeting Transport, Telecommunications and Energy 
in 201290 there was again general consensus given for the new Regulation; and, as a 
consequence, Regulation (EU) No 1285/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
repealed both Council Regulation (EC) No 876/2002 and Regulation (EC) No 683/2008.91  
This Regulation remains in force today.92 
 
 
5. GALILEO: Steps towards 2020 
  
Regulation (EU) No 1285/2013 articulated the significant of 2020 to the Galileo programme. 
Article 3 referred to the fact that both the deployment phase and the exploitation phase were 
scheduled for completion by 31 December 2020. 
 
From 2013 onwards there were a number of measures taken to underline the importance of 
using Galileo system within Europe. The Space Strategy for Europe93 adopted in 2016, 
announced measures introducing the use of the Galileo positioning and navigation services in 
mobile phones. And in its conclusions of 5 December 2017, as part of the required mid-term 
review, the Council emphasised it support for the development of a strong downstream 
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market for space-based applications and services.94 As part of this it stressed that adequate 
measures, including regulatory ones (where appropriate) should be taken to achieve the full 
compatibility of devices sold in the Union with the Galileo system, encouraging the 
application of Galileo-ready devices in the global market. 
 
5.1. Mid-term review 
 
Article 34 of Regulation 1285/2013 called for a mid-term review.95 (There were a number of 
documents associated with this review and the below is extracted from these.96) 
 
The interim evaluation assessed the progress of the Galileo and EGNOS programmes towards 
their objectives over the period 2014-2016. The aims stated were threefold, namely:  
(i) to inform stakeholders and the public on the status of the programmes;  
(ii) to contribute to improving their implementation; and  
(iii) to provide evidence-base for preparing the subsequent programming period.  
  
The review stated that the Galileo and EGNOS programmes had achieved all the milestones 
set for the period and that progress was positive in terms of delivering on all programme 
implementation objectives set for 2020.  
 
It was identified that the Galileo programme had recovered from the initial delay, caused in 
the previous period, in respect to launching satellites. Reference was made that this delay was 
partly due to the wrong insertion in orbit of the first two Full Operational Capability (FOC) 
satellites.97  
 
The review identified that the Galileo programme had now succeeded in the deployment of a 
total of 14 satellites launched in that specific review period (in addition to the 4 satellites 
launched in 2011). However, it was identified that the procurement of the remaining satellites 
(to complete the constellation of 24 satellites plus six in orbit spares), planned for 2016, had 
been postponed to 2017.  
 
It was also recognised that some Member States were expressing dissatisfaction and concern 
about the incomplete coverage of the then EU-28 States with the EGNOS services. However, 
positively it was reported, that as of the end of 2016, the Galileo and EGNOS programmes 
were implemented within the budget limits set by the GNSS Regulation. Comment was made 
that this was largely due to the governance system that was now in place, and, it was also said 
that the performance of the GSA had been positive overall.  
 
The strategic objectives of the Galileo and EGNOS programmes were reinforced98 in terms 
of:  
1. guaranteeing continuous and autonomous access to satellite navigation services for 
Europe interoperable with other GNSS systems, notably US GPS;  
2. ensuring resilience of the European economic infrastructure;  
3. maximising socio-economic benefits for European economy and society;  
4. building Europe’s technical capacity to develop, deploy and operate complex large-  
scale space infrastructures.  
 
In general, there was fortification given to the fact that the original rationale for EU 
intervention in the field of satellite navigation and the related objectives were still highly 
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relevant to society and the EU economy. However, it was also stated that there had been, and 
continued to be, challenges in realising the objectives. This said, it was acknowledged that 
society was becoming ever increasingly dependent on satellite navigation applications and 
services, including in terms of human safety.  
 
At the end of 2018, Regulation (EU) 2019/32099 was adopted (Article 2 stating it would 
become applicable as from 17 March 2022). This concerned caller location in emergency 
communications from mobile devices. Within the Regulation, reference was made to the 
significance of the single European emergency call number ‘112’ as part of the benefit of the 
Galileo system. It was identified that earlier legislation100 already required receivers in 112-
based eCall in-vehicle systems be compatible with the positioning services provided by the 
Galileo and the EGNOS systems. 
 
5.2. Challenges: will Galileo be realised in 2020? 
 
On 15 December 2016, Galileo started offering, initial, or Early Operational Capability 
(EOC).101 At the time, Paul Verhoef, ESA’s Director of the Galileo Programme and 
Navigation-related Activities, said, “Today’s announcement marks the transition from a test 
system to one that is operational.” However, he acknowledged, “Still, much work remains to 
be done.”102 
 
In July, 2019 the following comments were headlined, “Europe Billed Galileo as Its Answer 
to GPS. It’s Been Mostly Down for Days.”103 The press coverage referred to ‘mishap[s]’ 
befalling the programme – since the pilot phase of 2016. However, it also commented that 
users were unlikely to have even noticed the outage as phones and other devices are also 
programmed to other systems conjunction such as GPS, Russia’s Glonass system and even 
China’s Beidou in conjunction with Galileo. The GSA’s official comment acknowledged the 
service was down “affected by a technical incident related to its ground infrastructure.”104 It 
identified that the incident had led to a temporary interruption to Galileo (with the exception 
of the Galileo Search and Rescue (SAR) service).  
 
In 2017, the BBC had raised concerns that the onboard atomic clocks that drive the satellite-
navigation signals on the Galileo network have been failing at an alarming rate, identifying 
that across the 18 satellites now in orbit, nine clocks have stopped operating.105 
 
The initial plan was for Galileo to be fully operational before the end of the first decade of 
the new millennium. However, as it has continued to suffer a string of delays, cost have 
inevitably sky-rocketed. There have been various calculations as to the overall cost to build 
and operate Galileo.106 The UK Government stated that the “estimated costs for the Galileo 
programme in its entirety are less transparent than might be wished for.”107  
 
It therefore remains questionable as to the overall cost of Galileo; and indeed, when it will be 
completed. Whilst some challenges arguably could have been foreseen and factored in, other 
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6. Entering 2020: A year like no other! 
 
6.1. Covid-19 
Entering 2020: who could have predicted the challenges that Europe, indeed, the world, faced 
due to what remains a global pandemic, declared by the World Health Organization (WHO) 
on 11 March.108 The new type of coronavirus (SARS-CoV-2) was first ‘officially’ identified 
in China in December 2019.109 Since then, there has been a ripple affect across the globe. 
Whilst comments as to the effects of completion of Galileo are difficult to source, it is known 
that digital advancement, in the shape of the roll-out of 5G has been hampered and 
delayed.110 
 
Ironically, as European States start to plan their phased recoveries from the lockdown caused 
by the COVID-19 pandemic, the positioning delivered through satellite navigation (satnav) is 
becoming more critical than ever. Since the outbreak, many apps have been developed that 
use satnav-based location data to monitor the global spread of the disease. Determining 
accurate location is essential when assessing, monitoring and mapping the spread of a 
disease. Satnav based apps are even been used to help people to implement social distancing 
in queues and other public spaces.111  This said, with the promotion of the advantages of 
satnav systems, there have also come concerns that Galileo could be used to track individuals 
mobile phones as part of the monitoring or surveillance process. In this regard, the EU has 
striven to convey the message that the use of technology and related data (in particular 




6.2. The UK 
 
The UK joined the then European Economic Community (now known as the European 
Union) in 1973. Some 43 years later, after a public referendum in June, 2016, the UK decided 
to leave the Union.  However, it was not until 31 January 2020 that the UK formally left – 
this is viewed as ‘Brexit Day’. Currently, until the end of 2020, the UK is in a transition or in 
an implementation period. This began immediately after Brexit day and is due to end on 31 
December 2020, which ironically coincided with the anticipated realisation, or, fully 
operational completion, ‘deployed’ system, phase of Galileo. 
 
This transition phase allows time for the UK to negotiate the terms of the exit with the EU 
(the now 27 member states that comprise of it). Talks have and continue to centre across 
many policy areas; however, whilst the media (pre-Covid-19, at least) have reported on these 
aspects and made mention to key areas, largely concerned with the free movement of goods 
and persons, little reference has been made to the linked element of movement related to 
navigations systems, to which the UK has invested time and money in, contributing vast 
sums across the extended years. In essence, there has remained uncertainty as to the impact to 
the UK upon leaving the EU in respect to Galileo, and, in general, the European GNSS.  
 
By all accounts, the UK could be viewed as being naïve in terms of not anticipating that the 
EU would seek to stop the UK having full access (once it had left the EU) with it being 
reported that the UK government was somewhat taken aback that the EU plans to exclude 
Britain from the Galileo satellite programme (or parts of it) due to Brexit.113 
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In December 2018 it was reported that the UK was poised to walk away from “negotiations 
over its post-Brexit involvement in the European Union’s Galileo global navigation satellite 
system (GNSS)”114 as the EU began excluding the UK from security aspects of the project’s 
development in preparation for Brexit.  The UK Government’s press release was titled, ‘UK 
to tell EU it will no longer seek access to secure aspects of Galileo.’115 Within this statement, 
reference was made to the fact that British Armed Forces were due to have access to 
Galileo’s encrypted system when it is now said to become fully operational in 2026. 
However, according to the the National Cyber Security Centre and Ministry of Defence 
expressed the view that, “it would not be in the UK’s security interests to use the system’s 
secure elements if it had not been fully involved in their development.”116 
 
Earlier in 2018 it was said that the UK was pondering partnering with another country, such 
as Australia, to build a new GNSS with the British government also looking to study the 
potential of building an independent alternative to Galileo.117 However, Christopher 
Newman, a professor of space law and policy at Northumbria University, has indicated that 
“[t]he cost of developing a national replacement has been estimated to be in the region of £3 
billion to £5 billion ($3.8 billion to $6.3 billion)” which he states “is a significant expenditure 
when considering that the current U.K. space budget is only £370 million ($470 million) per 
year with the majority of that going to fulfil U.K. commitments to ESA.”118 Though, this 
projection fails to take into account the enormous investment in the European Space and 
GNSS programmes, which potentially could be lost or not fully maximised and/or returned 
on – in respect to the substantial investment in this space area. According to one report the 
UK has contributed in the region of £1.2 billion on the Galileo project alone.119  
 
Conversely, it has also been reported that engineering academics at Sussex University have 
drawn-up plans for a Galileo replacement that would give the UK a more effective satellite 
navigation system but at a fraction of the price of the EU project.120 
 
The direction being expressed indicates that the UK has and continues to explore options to 
deploy in space and build its own Global Navigation Satellite System that can “help guide 
military drones, run energy networks and provide essential services for civilian smart 
phones.”121  Whilst also looking, at the same time to “work with the US to continue accessing 
its trusted GPS system.”122 A (2018) BBC report also pointed to the fact that the UK was 
looking to claw back some of its investment, asserting that the EU repay £1bn if it continued 
to push for exclusion from the Galileo satellite navigation system after Brexit.  At the same 
time, David Davis’s (of the then Brexit department) indicated, that without UK contributions 
and involvement, the EU may have to find an extra €1bn (£876m).123 There is the potential 
that the project will suffer further delays, initially predicted, in 2018, to be up to three years 
without British technology.124 As it is, the (updated) date proposed for realising a fully 
operational Galileo system in 2020 has invariable now been pushed back again with 
estimates, as above, extending past 2023 to 2026.125 
 
The UK is recognised to be a world-leader in developing satellite technology with Britain 
having a 40% share of the global export market for small satellites. It also makes major 
components for one in four of the world’s telecommunications satellites.”126  
 
The UK is advocating that it has played an “integral part in designing, developing and 
managing Galileo to date, particularly the delivery of payloads for satellites, the ground 
control segment and the development of the PRS software.”127 The UK has also aided to 
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support Galileo’s coverage by means of hosting two sensor stations at secure locations in the 
south Atlantic.128 However, due to the ‘consequence of the UK withdrawal from the EU’ the 
back-up security monitoring centre for the programme has now been relocated to Spain from 
the UK.129 
 
In 2020, it is still said that the UK is looking at variable access scenarios,130 with the UK 
Space Agency reportedly stating that it would “not be drawn on the fate of those shifted onto 
other work” …reaffirming, that, the “UK will continue to play a leading role in European 
Space Agency programmes, from missions to Mars to Earth observation and advanced 
telecommunications. The work to develop a UK Global Navigation Satellite System, as an 
alternative to the EU Galileo system, [was said to be] progressing well.”131 However, other 
reports have pointed to the fact that the UK has had to put some of its plans and aspirations 
on hold due to costs being higher than those initially envisaged.132 
 
6.2.1. The 2020 affect to UK’s space endeavours: post Brexit 
According to the UK Governments (latest) position, after 1 January, 2021, any contractor 
working on the programme should contact the relevant contracting authority to make sure 
that arrangements were still in place to comply with the conditions of the contract and to 
avoid possible penalties.133  
 
The advice being conveyed to users is that UK businesses and organisations will continue to 
be able to use “the freely available ‘open’ signal to develop products and services for 
consumers, and will be able to continue using the open position, navigation and timing 
services provided by Galileo and EGNOS.”134   
 
However, this is not the same for the following areas, whereby after 2020 all involvement 
and access ceases in relation to: 
• the use of Galileo (including the future Public Regulated Service (PRS)) for defence 
or critical national infrastructure; 
• access to the encrypted Galileo PRS; 
• and any future development of Galileo projects 
 
The PRS has been enforced in statutory law in Britain.135 Access to PRS is controlled through 
operational and technical means, including governmental grade encryption. Therefore, 
limited or no access would impact upon other areas (outside the military) that have a public 
safety and emergency service role including: 
• fire brigades 
• health services (ambulance) 
• humanitarian aid 
• search and rescue 
• police 
• coastguard 
• border control 
• customs 
• civil protection units. 
 
The UK seems resolved to the fact that after 1 January 2021 it will not have access to key 
aspects of Galileo that it has contributed to and at the same time it has delayed its own 
replacement system, an independent sovereign satellite navigation system that it stated would 
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be a symbol of post-Brexit independence.  Similar to Galileo, disagreement, internally, has 





Initially, Galileo was supposed to be fully operational by 2008, although it was pushed back 
to 2020. The GSA website still states that it expects all Galileo services to be available once 
the satellite constellation and ground infrastructure are completed, which is says is “expected 
to happen by 2020.”136  
 
Today Galileo is even behind this schedule and hugely over budget with costs continuing to 
rise and no transparent date being openly declared as to when it will finally become fully 
operational and having full capabilities (FOC). One of the most realistic forecasts seems to 
point to 2026 (at the earliest).  
 
Currently, the European GNSS only offers initial services from Galileo, meaning navigation 
signals come from 26 satellites. Only when the 30 Galileo satellites are in their final orbit and 
fully deployed will the European satellite navigation system be complete and fully 
operational. 
 
In terms of costs, the EU was also unable to stay to its original plan. According to statements, 
in 1999, it had budgeted between 2.2 and 2.9 billion euros for the construction of the system; 
whereas, the EU revised budget provided for 7.2 billion euros to be spent on the construction 
of the system by 2020 — plus a further 3 billion euros for its operation.137  With the extended 
date to completion now six years in the future these costs will once again rise. 
 
Whilst all reports seem to continuously support the need for a European Global Satellite 
Navigations System to reduce reliance on the American GPS system and rival other 
competitors such as the Russian GLONASS system and the newer Chinese equivalent - 
COMPASS (and Beidou/Beidou-2) – this huge delay must surely compromise some of the 
very objectives and arguments put forward advocating the need for a standalone European 
system.  
 
Galileo was always said to be a valuable asset in terms of contributing to European safety and 
the safety/security of its citizens. The advantages of utilising Galileo has often been cited in 
terms of the development of numerous applications in areas that are associated, directly or 
indirectly, with Community policies, such as transport (positioning and measurement of the 
speed of moving bodies – including aviation), motorway tolls, and related insurances; 
alongside law enforcement (surveillance of suspects, measures to combat crime), customs 
and excise operations (investigations on the ground, etc.), agriculture (grain or pesticide dose 
adjustments depending on the terrain, etc.) and fisheries (monitoring of boat movements). 
 
There is little doubt that space will increasingly be the frontier that man will continuously 
turn to, to aid and address problems and issues on earth.138  However, this comes at a huge 
financial cost. 
 
For the next phase of the EU bloc’s long-term budget, running from 2021 to 2027, the 
European Commission has proposed the allocation of 16 billion euros, for its space 
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programme, including Galileo.139 Elżbieta Bieńkowska, the Commissioner for the Internal 
Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs issuing a statement in 2019 stated the 
following:  
“space technology, data and services have become indispensable in the daily lives of 
Europeans….. The new EU Space Programme will not only do that, but also address 
global challenges, such as fighting climate change, a transition to a low-carbon 
economy, smart mobility and digital economy. More will be invested in space 
activities to adapt to new needs and technologies, while reinforcing Europe's 
autonomous and secure access to space.……. Space matters for Europe.”140  
 
Space also matters for the UK – although it now stands in a somewhat precarious position, 
particularly in terms of utilising satellite navigation systems for security (military) and some 
safety (public service) applications directly linked to PRS. The UK has made a huge 
contribution to the development of Galileo. The withdrawal away from the EU comes at 
arguably both a financial cost as well as having potential implications to citizens of the UK 
(in terms of protection viewed across the area of jobs and invariably safety/security and 
advancement - economic growth and competitiveness).  
 
Galileo has presented massive challenges to the EU and seen a number of revisions to 
governance and administration systems to get it where it is today, but it is still not complete.  
The UK stands to experience the same, or similar, should it pursue its own version in the 
future. Inevitably, there are lessons that can and should be learnt but these should not be 
underestimated. Increasingly we will rely on communication systems that utilise satellite 
technology – mankind will continue to want to travel; stifled in 2020 by a virus that actually 
swept across the Earth because of mankind’s reliance on various transport systems. 
Ironically, we turned to Space and to virtual communications systems in a period of 
uncertainty, reinforcing, once more, that there remains merit and worth of pursuing satellite 
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